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The 11W Military History Series: The Battle of Minden, 1757

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JKH1232's picture
November 29, 2015 at 8:57am
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We’ve explore the era of the tercio pretty well- not comprehensively, of course, but we’ve see its origins and many of the most famous battles of the pike and shot era.  It’s probably time to move on- and, by request, we will turn our eyes to the Napoleonic Era. 

However, to really understand the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and why, from a military history standpoint, they’re so significant, we need to look at what came before, and, to do that, we’ll study a fairly typical battle of the Age of Reason… so, picking semi-randomly, we will consider the Battle of Minden, fought between the French and British in Hesse during the Seven Years’ War.  This will be a way to look at the way wars were fought before the massive shifts in tactics, logistics and organization that marked the era from 1792 to 1815.

 

Warfare in the Age of Reason

The armies of the 1700s were, essentially, mirror images of each other.  There were some differences between the armies of the Great Powers- the Prussians were a little better at drill, the British a little better at shooting, the Austrians a little better at skirmishing, the Russians had a few more cannon, and the French were really good at losing.  That last part had a major impact on the French Revolution, but is a smaller part of the story, despite the fact that the French fought on one side in Minden. 

The Wars of the 1600s and early 1700s allowed kings in Europe to finish clamping down on their nobles, allowing them to establish more and more absolute reigns.  This also brought a series of reforms, some based on the Enlightenment, others based on Louis XIV’s ruthless nature, that brought a steady income to the royal fisc.  This funding allowed kings to pay for standing armies which they could maintain in peacetime.  This allowed them to break their reliance on mercenaries and fluctuating employment of national troops, and settle into command of armies of professional soldiers in national service.  Perhaps nothing symbolizes this better than the establishment of uniforms.  In the 1600s, soldiers wore what they pleased.  In the 1700s, the kings gave them rather nice uniforms they had to wear:

There was also a switch in weapons.  The invention of the socket bayonet in the early 1700s led to the disestablishment of the pike square as a main formation, though, those were increasingly on the outs in late 1600s anyway.  The socket bayonet allowed each infantryman to serve both as a pikeman and as a musketeer, as needed.  Given the number of muskets in the infantry, the formations switched again to maximize firepower to the front.  Infantry deployed in two or three ranks deep, usually in line.  Most armies tried to deploy in two or three lines of infantry, so that units had support to their flanks and their rear, allowing them to concentrate fire to the front.  Infantry marched in tight formations, both to mass fire and to allow the formation of bayonet hedges to ward off cavalry.  It also facilitated control of the formations and their maneuver, as well as improved morale for the individual soldier. 

The musket itself underwent a significant change in the early 1700s as well, from the matchlock, which dropped a smoldering match into the powder pan to ignite the charge, to the flintlock, which brought a piece of flint against a steel plate to produce sparks to ignite the powder pan and, from there, the main charge.  This was more reliable, particularly in wet conditions.  The musket was still smoothbore, to facilitate fast loading.  As a result, most shooting began at about 50-70 yards, and most serious firefights took place at about 20 to 25 yards.  Generally speaking, armies either opted for a close range shootout, with an assault once the enemy began to waver, or an out and out attack where the attacking force gave a point blank shot before closing for the attack.  Either way, attacks were made with the bayonet.  Assaults were not pell mell sprints into the enemy- that’s a good way to get skewered.  Instead, attacks were made at the walk, holding tight formation to push through the enemy.  This video captures something of the spirit of it:

Cavalry were typically divided into two kinds: light and heavy.  Light cavalry wasn’t really meant for battle.  It was used for scouting, protecting supplies, and raiding enemy supplies.  They also did well in pursuit, or covering retreats.  Heavy cavalry, some still wearing breastplates and helmets, were meant for battle.  These units usually went to the flanks of the army, and battled amongst themselves to try and capture the flanks, or were kept in reserve.  A well timed heavy horse charge could shatter a wavering enemy- though, there weren’t too many wavering enemies in the era.  Flank attacks were more common, though the volume of fire infantry produced made cavalry charges risky.

Artillery had come a long way from the 1600s.  There was a lot more of it- armies with more than 100 or even 200 guns weren’t uncommon.  They were easier to maneuver- though, rarely moved once battle began- and easier to site.  Better understandings of ballistics allowed for more accurate fire at range, and, if properly positioned, artillery could fire over the heads of friendly troops while they advanced.  Better procedures allowed for quicker reloading- a shot every minute or two wouldn’t be out of the question in the early going of a battle.  Of course, artillery was vital in sieges as well, as it had been for 400 years or so.

The main unit of maneuver and organization was the regiment.  Many regiments were permanent establishments, though wartime usually saw a large number raised, as well.  Regiments were usually made up of about 10 companies of, in theory, about 100 men, though, units were rarely full up even in peacetime, much less on campaign.  Regiments maneuvered as one unit on the field, and had their own depot units organized for recruiting and resupply.  Above the regiment, things get more ad hoc.  Many armies brigaded their regiments together to make things easier to command- two or three regiments to the brigade.  Regiments and  brigades were usually assigned to divisions- though, divisions had no standard size.  The army tended to have as many divisions as the commanding officer had trustworthy subordinates.  The commanding general would assign what units seemed reasonable, based on the plan of attack or defense.  Divisions were usually either infantry, with or without artillery, or cavalry. 

The armies were supplied from magazines in fortresses.  Before wars, fortresses were stocked with massive supplies of food, powder, ball, shot, spare shoes, whatever.  Armies relied heavily on these stocks of supplies during their maneuvers.  Fortresses housed huge bakeries to bake bread, and supplies of bread made up much of the official ration.  The rest could be supplied from fortresses, a little foraging, or from entrepreneurs who followed the army, selling supplies to commanders or individual soldiers.  The importance of keeping lines open to fortresses made keeping them under control important, and usually prevented any deep raids or offensives by an army.   Getting too far from magazines left supply lines open to attack, as Frederick the Great learned in the War of Austrian Succession. 

The Battle of Minden

It would take a great philosopher and historian…. Well, not particularly.  The Seven Years War is pretty understandable, but awfully complex.  For our discussion, it’s probably not worth rehashing a lot of the back and forth.  It’s easiest to say that Prussia and Britain were on one side, while Austria, France, Russia and Sweden were on the other.  The general plan in Europe was for Austria and her allies to dogpile the Prussians.  To do that, the French had to march an army through the old Holy Roman Empire.

The only thing that really stood in their way was the fact that, at this point, the King of England was also the Elector Count of Hannover, and had a lot of allies in the smaller states left behind in the Treaty of Westphalia.  Ultimately, that meant that, if the French wanted to get an army over to Prussia, they would need to fight their way through the British forces in the Western part of Germany. 

The campaign had gone well for the French in the early going.  1757 saw rather significant victories, most importantly the French victory of Hastenbeck.  However, French successes were not enough to gain control of Hanover, and, in 1758, they lost ground to the British and their allies.  To counter this, they sent some reinforcements in the winter of 1758, as did the British.  These reinforced armies met at the Battle of Bergen, and the British forces failed to dislodge the French Army.  This allowed the French to go on a methodical offensive for the summer.

In late July, the two armies met again.  The French had established a strong defensive position, which they were slow to abandon.  To try and draw them out, the British began organizing to go after French supplies, which brought the French out to play.  On August 1st, 1759, they met near Minden.  Both armies were about even in strength- 44,000 French to 37,000 British, 162 French guns to 181 British guns. 

The French got to the field first, and opened with a cannonade against the British columns as they approached and shook out into line.  By about 6, both sides had formed up into a formation typical of the era- infantry in double or triple lines for support, the flanks of their lines supported by towns, rivers or woods.  The only oddity was that the French deployed their horse to the center of the line, rather than to the flanks.  But, given the terrain, it gave them the most room to maneuver.

Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, the British commander, planned a general attack once his forces got their act together.  However, his order to his right flank commander, Frederick von Spoercken, were either poorly written, misrelayed, or misunderstood.  Before anyone could stop them, they dislodged themselves from the line and began marching towards the French center.  Not sure what was going on, some other troops from the British center joined them, and began a march towards the French cavalry.

Not one to look a gift horse in the mouth, the French commander, the Marquis of Contades, ordered the horse at the  center of his line into the attack.  Seeing the horse thundering down on them, the British forces halted and formed up into a tight line.  At ten yards, they launched a volley, smashing the first line of the French cavalry.  Contades sent in the second line, while Ferdinand rushed to get more men to support what was rapidly becoming the decisive point of the battle.  The French second line found itself pinned between the disciplined fire and formation of Spoercken’s men, and broke as well.  Contades then sent in the heavy horse to finish the attack, while Ferdinand piled in more men and cannon.  A fierce fire developed as the French reserve horse bore down on the out of position British.  While they gained the flank of that column, British reinforcements arrived, and drove off the last of the French horse. 

Desperate to save something, Contades sent in the infantry at the center, hoping to catch the Spoercken in the flank.  However, Ferdinand’s troops had their act together, and they moved to block the attack.  A sharp shootout developed in the center, but the British had more troops to throw into the fight- including a charge by British cavalry into the rear of the attacking French.  The collapse of this attack left the entire French center open, and the French left began to collapse.  Sensing defeat, the Duc du Broglie, the only really competent French subordinate commander, pulled his troops back to act as a rear guard.  Ferdinand called for the bulk of his horse under General George Sackville to attack to finish the French off, but Sackville refused to go, allowing what was left of the French army to retreat in good order over the Weser River. 

The French left behind about 7,000 casualties on the field, while the British suffered about 2700 .  The Battle of Minden was part of a larger string of successes in 1758, particularly the naval battle of Quiberon Bay, that freed up the British Isles from the threat of invasion.  With this threat lifted, the British were able to shift forces from England to North America, India and the Continent.  These forces were able to launch offensives into Hesse in Europe, the Cartinanc in India, and Ohio and Montreal in North America.  It set the French back on the losing foot on all fronts in the war, and allowed the Prussians to worry more about the Russians and the Austrians.  While Minden helped the British get back on the right foot against the French, it did little to help the Prussians, in the end.  That required an entirely separate miracle in 1763, which left Europe pretty much where it started the war, but with massive shifts in North America and India, vaulting the British to prominence and deepening the debts of the French monarchy. 

Those debts will be particularly important in the 1780s, but, that’s something to talk about another time.

 

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