Well, I didn’t know how much I missed football until the spring game. And, now, I have to wait forever for September! Oh, well. I guess there’s always military history, in the meantime. This week, we’re moving from the rather short War of the Third Coalition, to the rather short War of the Fourth Coalition. This will be followed by the rather short War of the Fifth Coalition and the Peninsular War, and the rather short War of the Sixth Coalition.
If you like this sort of stuff, feel free to leave a comment below. If you're looking for some of the earlier battles in the Napoleonic Wars, or military history in general, please click here.
The War of the Fourth Coalition
The Battle of Austerlitz, and the subsequent Treaty of Pressburg, drove Austria out of the war, as previously noted. Before the Battle, the Prussians were mobilizing and organizing their army to enter the war in the spring of 1806. However, after Austerlitz, the Prussians decided to pump the brakes a bit on the idea, keeping their army together, but testing the diplomatic waters. This left Britain, Sweden and Russia at war with France, but, with Prussia and Austria both at peace with France, the opportunities were rather limited: The only real staging ground for a war against French controlled areas would be Swedish Pomerania against French occupied Hanover.
However, as after Campo Formio and Amiens, French diplomatic mistakes prevented the general peace Napoleon tried to negotiate. These started in March of 1806, when Murat, who had been made the Duke of Berg and Cleves, rather undiplomatically ejected a Prussian garrison in the area. While unfortunate behavior could be worked around, diplomatic duplicity couldn’t. The Duchy of Hanover, occupied by France since 1803, became something of a soccer ball kicked around in negotiations. In order to secure Prussian neutrality, Napoleon had promised to turn Hanover over to Prussia. However, in an effort to secure a general peace, he had promised to give it back to its rightful owners, the British. When the Prussians learned of this, they grew rather angry, and began preparing for war.
What ultimately pushed the Prussians to war, though, was the Confederation of the Rhine. The Prussians, like the Austrians considered the small principalities of the old Holy Roman Empire their playground, not a French playground. French alliances in Bavaria had been an Austrian concern, however, the addition of northern German principalities into the Confederation of the Rhine made it a Prussian concern. When Napoleon began organizing the Confederation without consulting or including the Prussians, King Frederick Wilhelm III balked, and protested, worried that Napoleon was looking to continue French expansion. Napoleon offered to include Prussia in forming a new German Confederation, but after being caught in the Hanoverian lie, the Prussians thought the worst of his offer, and looked at the whole thing suspiciously.
While the Prussians had effectively cut off diplomatic relations with France, there was still a chance for some sort of diplomatic rapprochement, or even for time to let wounds heal. However, one, seemingly small, event pushed the Prussians to war. In the spring and summer of 1806, a bookseller in Augsburg, Johann Philipp Palm, organized the printing and sale of an anonymous pamphlet. This pamphlet was highly critical of Napoleon’s entry into Europe, accused him of being a tyrant, and called upon all True Germans to resist French efforts to humiliate them. The pamphlet’s author remains unknown to this day, but Napoleon could not brook the insult and challenge to his authority. He had Palm arrested as he fled to Austria, and he was summarily executed by the French military in late August, 1806. His death led Frederick Wilhelm to demand the French leave German lands immediately, and, on October 1st, 1806, Prussia declared war.
Maneuver Towards Jena
The Prussians faced a few problems with their declaration of war. One, it came late in the year- there isn’t much campaigning time left in the year by October 1st. This meant that the Prussians either had to accept battle with Napoleon quickly, or face a winter campaign- something the Prussians usually tried to avoid. Two, the Prussians had caught the rest of the Coalition by surprise with their ultimatum. The Russian Army wasn’t anywhere near Prussia, and couldn’t march out to join with them before winter set in, nor could the British or the Swedes offer much support due to the rapid change in Prussian position. Third, Napoleon *had* figured out the Prussians were on the road to war rather early, and maneuvered to the Prussian border to invade Prussia as soon as the declaration of war arrived.
Napoleon decided to move up the Saale River valley, across Prussia’s southern border. He crossed the wooded hills in Landfreidburg in three columns of two corps each, figuring the Prussians couldn’t have blocked all three. In fact, the Prussians had not been able to block any of them. Their armies were still forming up into three groups- about 90,000 men under the Duke of Brunswick, 38,000 men under Prince Hohenlohe-Inglefingen, and 15,000 men under Ernst von Ruechel. These armies were forming up to the west of the Saale, and neither side really knew where the others were.
Once into more open land, Napoleon formed his army into a more or less diamond formation for maneuver. This allowed his corps to move quickly, while spread out enough to catch the Prussians and allow for a more detailed maneuver. His forces caught a Prussian detachment on the 9th, and fought a slightly larger one on the 10th. These clashes led Napoleon to realize that the Prussians weren’t to the north, as he previously suspected. Looking the maps over again, he decided they were likely to his left, in the west. He spent the 11th wheeling the army around, putting Davout and Bernadotte to the north, with Lannes and Augereau to the south. These corps began heading west to cross the Saale, while Ney and Soult tarried to the east, in case the Prussians showed up there unexpectedly.
The Duke of Brunswick, in overall command of the Prussian army, found the French army by the actions fought on the 9th and 10th. He figured the Prussians would keep heading north, and ordered the bulk of his army to the Saale River, near Naumberg. He then ordered Hohenlohe to the south, to Jena, to cut Napoleon’s supplies. However, on the 13th, the Prussians found out about the French wheel to the west, and Prussian commanders held a council of war to discuss what to do about it. Ultimately, the Prussians faced a choice- concentrate at Jena, and attack the French on the 14th. The other was to retreat to the north, through Auerstadt, using Hohenlohe’s army as a rearguard. While concentrating at Jena might have yielded a better result, catching Napoleon in a disorganized state, they chose the second option, sending the Duke of Brunswick to the north, where Davout lay, while Hohenlohe held the fort at Jena against Napoleon. In response to the Prussian move to the North, Napoleon sent a series of orders to Davout and Bernadotte, first to unite, then for Bernadotte to move to the south, then for Bernadotte, if he was close to Davout, to stay with Davout, but if he had left, for him to keep going. While Bernadotte was close to Davout when this order arrived, he kept moving south. Meanwhile, Napoleon recalled Ney and Soult.
The Battle of Jena
The Battle of Jena-Auerstadt is really two battles- Napoleon against Hohenlohe, and Brunswick against Davout. We will take them separately, as a result.
Hohenlohe, unable to keep Napoleon from crossing the Saale, decided to take up positions on the heights overlooking the river and some of its tributaries. In front of Napoleon, he deployed a division under Frederich von Tauentzein. He sent Von Holtzendorf to the north, to guard the Salle crossing at Dorndorf. Napoleon needed some maneuver room, so he decided to attack out of Jena with Lannes’ cops in the lead. Behind him, Soult would maneuver to the north, and Augereau to the south to envelop the Prussian positions. Ney would arrive later, and act as a reserve.
The attack opened at 0600, in a rather dense fog. Lannes concentrated on the villages of Lutzeroda and Closewitz, where Tauentzein had concentrated his forces. After a few hours sharp fighting in the early morning, Tauentzein’s men began to run low on ammunition, and fell back on the reserves at Vierzehnheiligen. At 0930, Tauentzein launched a counterattack with the reserves there, and drove Lannes back to his starting point, starting a fight that raged back and forth in the triangle of Lutzeroda, Closewitz, and Vierzehnheiligen. However, Lannes’ initial attack had cleared the way for Soult to march on Hohenlohe’s right, and Augereau to move towards Hohenlohe’s left.
Realizing he was, in fact, facing most of the French army rather than part of a rearguard or similar smaller force, Hohenlohe started calling in reinforcements. He pulled Grawert’s Division from the west to reinforce Tauentzein, summed Ruechel’s army to try and face Augereau, and von Holtzendorf to try and catch Soult in the flank. Meanwhile, he order Tauentzein, who was being outflanked by the French maneuvers, to retreat back to Vierzehnheiligen. By 1000, the battle had reached a bit of a lull, as both sides were trying to reestablish themselves.
The lull broke shortly. Von Holtendorf’s men marched against Soult’s right flank, forcing Soult to stop and deal with the attack. He quickly shifted his light infantry against von Holzendorf first. The clouds of skirmishers brought the Prussians to a halt, and Soult called up columns of infantry to launch a furious attack which drove von Holtzendorf off to the north. Meanwhile, Ney and his advance guard arrived, and fell into the gap between Lannes and Augereau. He attacked furiously south of Vierzehnheiligen, breaking around the bulk of Grawart’s division, just as Grawart’s men launched an attack against Lannes. Ney’s men broke towards the rear of the Prussians, but had to stop as the Prussian heavy cavalry formed up to attack Ney’s isolated forces. Napoleon ordered Lannes and Augereau to reinforce Ney. Augereau had some success in reaching Ney, but Lannes was stopped cold.
At this point, Hohenlohe, rather surprisingly, had Napoleon right where he should want him- out of reserves, with the French lines stretched thin while the bulk of his forces fresh and concentrated for the attack against Lannes at the French center, exhausted and out of support as Soult chased von Holtzendorf, with Ney isolated and about to get hit by cavalry and Augreau trapped between the Prussian horse and infantry coming from Ruechel’s forces. However, at the moment, he balked, and decided to wait for more forces.
While the Prussians waited, French troops continued to pour into Jena- the rest of Auguereau’s, Soult’s and Ney’s Corps, along with the lead elements of Murat’s cavalry corps. Napoleon started the day with about 50,000 men, but by 1200, another 42,000 had arrived in Jena, awaiting orders. He quickly deployed these troops as the Prussians halted in place, reinforcing his line in preparation for an all out attack up and down the line. This attack broke Holtzendorf’s men, while Grawart tried to fall back to the line between Gross and Klein Romestedt, where Tauentzein had gone to rest from earlier fighting. The French redoubled the ferocity of their attack, and the Prussian army fell apart in the fighting withdrawal, even as Ruechel’s men arrived on the field. Napoleon unleashed Murat, who fell on the retreating Prussians, breaking up Hohenlohe and Ruechel’s forces.
The Prussians left behind 4,000 dead and about 8,000 wounded, with another 15,000 taken prisoner, at the cost of about 2,000 French dead and 4,000 wounded.
The Battle of Auerstadt
While Napoleon was struggling to overcome a rearguard a third the size of his army, Davout faced an army about three times the size of his corps. This battle is rather less complicated.
Both Davout and Brunswick were forming up their armies as the fog lifted at about 0700. Davout was marching in a column towards Jena, one division behind the other. Brunswick was also bringing his army along up the road, with the Prince of Orange’s men in reserve, Gebhard von Blucher leading the Advance Guard, and the divsions of Wartensleben and Schmettau in between. When the fog lifted, Blucher launched an immediate attack against the French leading division, under Guidin. Unfortunately, he didn’t tell anyone he was going to attack until it was well underway, and so his unsupported effort quickly ground to a halt as the French occupied defensive positions.
Seeing Bulcher’s repulse, Brunswick decided to hold up until he could bring up the rest of Wartensleben’s and Schmettau’s divisions and prepare a proper, organized attack. This allowed Davout to bring up another division, Friant’s and deploy it to the north. At 1000, the Prussian attack began, with Schmettau’s marching into the bulk of Davout’s deployed forces north of Hassenhausen, while Wartensleben attached south of Hassenhausen. Schmettau suffered a bloody repulse and fell back, but Wartensleben’s attack went well, forcing Davout to shift his reserves to slow the attack. However, rather than pressing Davout’s flank, Schmettau moved towards the center, attacking Hassenhausen repeatedly. In one of these attacks, Schmettau was shot twice in the torso, while the Duke of Bruswick was shot twice in the head. Both men died after the battle, but the casualties left the attack- and the army- rudderless.
King Frederich Wilhelm was with the army, but vacillated as the Prussian attack faltered before assuming command. As he took command, he was deprived of advice from the army’s chief of staff, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who was with the Duke of Brunswick when the Duke fell. This delay allowed the last French division, Morand’s, to arrive to fill the weaknesses on the French left. The Prince of Orange also made it to the battlefield. However, rather than use this force to attack either the French right or left, the King split the division in two, sending some to both flanks. By 1100, both sides had all the troops on the field they would have.
Morand’s men carried much of the rest of the battle. Wartensleben, with reinforcements from the Prince of Orange, tried for the French center, but Morand’s men made a disciplined attack. The Prussian cavalry reserve followed, but smashed into Morand’s squares and broke. Following this attack, Morand formed up in attack columns, and, and 1200 or so, launched a major attack into Wartensleben’s division, breaking it and driving it off the field. As Morand went on the attack, Davout gathered up Friand’s division, and attacked on the opposite flank. This pushed the remains of Schmettau’s old force and the Prince of Orange’s men back, and the King of Prussia decided to retreat. The remains of the Prussian force formed up a rearguard under Blucher, and fell back towards Jena.
The Prussian army retreated from Auerstadt in good order, leaving 5,000 dead, 10,000 wounded, and 3,000 prisoners. Davout lost about 2500 dead and 5000 or so wounded. However, on the retreat from Auerstadt, the Prussian army ran into the fugitives from Jena, and the army fell into chaos. The French pursuit over the next several days destroyed the surviving forces as an effective fighting force, and Frederich Wilhelm fled to Poland, where the Russians were forming up for an attack of their own, with just a few thousand Prussians to help them. On October 27th, just two weeks after Jena-Auerstadt, Napoleon entered Berlin.
